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ABSTRACT 
This is not the 1950’s where test pilots needed 
the ‘right stuff’ and certainly not the beginning 
of aviation where the Wright brother’s early 
designs needed pilots with more than the right 
stuff. In those formative years of aviation and 
jet development, designers and pilots did not 
have the same design understanding and 
knowledge that we have today. In addition, 
they did not have the same understanding and 
knowledge of Systems Safety engineering and 
Human Factors expertise that we have today. 
Manned suborbital flights of today should be 
undertaken in vehicles that have been designed 
effectively with appropriately derived safety 
requirements including fault-tolerance, safe 
life and design-for-minimum risk approaches – 
and all to an acceptable level of safety. 
Therefore, although initial suborbital pilots 
will originate from flight test schools and still 
possess similar traits to their earlier test pilot 
brethren, they should be protected by the right 
(safe) thing by design and analysis rather than 
rely on the right stuff due to ineffective design 
and operating procedures. The paper presents a 
review of the SpaceShip2 accident as a case 
study to highlight the right (safe) things that 
should be considered in the design, analysis 
and operations for suborbital operators. The 
authors of this paper contend that suborbital 
piloted vehicles should be designed with the 
knowledge and understanding and lessons 
learned from those early X-plane flights, 
lessons learned from general space safety, 
lessons learned from pilot Human Factors/ 
Crew Resource Management training and by 
understanding that safety management and 
safety engineering are essential disciplines that 
should be integrated with the design team from 
the concept phase. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During the early days of airliners, military fast 
jet and rocket development, aircraft were 
plagued by technical issues that resulted in 
incidents and accidents. In the case of US fast 
jet and rocket development on the X-15 
project, this meant relying on pilots with the 
‘right stuff’. Consequently, throughout the 
project, this meant reactive fixes to the 
reliability and design issues i.e. ‘fly, fix, fly’. 
As technology and complexity improved over 
time, causal factors identified in incidents and 
accidents are more plagued by people and 
organisations. To counter this, technical 
designers are now being supported by other 
engineering disciplines including human 
factors and systems safety engineering:  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Safety Thinking [1] 
 
2. REVIEW OF ACCIDENT CREW 
CASUAL FACTORS 
Based on National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB) sources of significant crew 
causal factors in 93 major hull losses from 
1977-1984, Lautman and Gallimore [2] found 
that pilot deviation and inadequate cross-check 
were the main causal factors:  
• 33% -  Pilot deviated from SOP’s 
• 26% -  Inadequate cross check by 
second crew member 
• 9% -  Crew’s not trained for correct 
response in emergency situations 
• 6% - Pilot did not recognise need 
for go-around 
• 4% - Pilot Incapacitation 
• 4% - Inadequate piloting skills 
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• 3% -  Improper procedure during 
go-around 
• 3% - Crew errors during training 
flight 
• 3% - Pilot not conditioned to 
respond promptly to Ground 
Proximity Warning 
• 3% - Inexperienced on ac type 
 
The findings are backed up in a more recent 
Boeing study as presented by NTSB senior 
expert, Sumwalt [3]: 
 
 
Figure 2: Accident Causal Factors – 
Extract from Sumwalt Presentation 
 
3. REVIEW OF SPACESHIP 2 
ACCIDENT 
During Powered Flight number four (PF04) 
SpaceShip2 (SS2) suffered an in-flight break-
up shortly after rocket motor ignition. This 
was due to uncommanded deployment of the 
feathering device at Mach 0.8 and under the 
aerodynamic loads tore the vehicle apart. The 
NTSB conclusions [4] had no doubt that the 
initiating (causal) factor was the co-pilot, as 
non-handling pilot, incorrectly unlocking the 
feathering device by operating the arming 
lever early (at Mach 0.8 instead of Mach 1.4). 
The NTSB concludes that the co-pilot was 
experiencing high workload as a result of 
recalling tasks from memory while performing 
under time pressure and with vibration and 
loads that he had not recently experienced, 
which increased the opportunity for errors. 
The NTSB notes that Scaled did not recognize 
and mitigate the possibility that a test pilot 
could unlock the feather early. 
 
The accident co-pilot was the co-pilot of SS2 
on seven glide flights occurring between 
October 10, 2010, and August 28, 2014. He 
had been the co-pilot of SS2 for PF01 (one 
powered flight) on April 2013. 
 
The co-pilot, age 39, held an airline transport 
pilot (ATP) certificate with a rating for 
airplane multi-engine land and commercial 
pilot privileges for airplane single-engine land 
and sea and glider. The co-pilot held a second-
class medical certificate, dated May 22, 2014, 
with the limitation that he must wear 
corrective lenses. The cockpit image recording 
showed that the co-pilot was wearing glasses 
during the accident flight. 
The NTSB concluded that the pilot and co-
pilot were properly certificated and qualified. 
 
3.1. ANALYSIS VERSUS NTSB 
KNOWN (AVIATION) CREW 
CASUAL FACTORS 
The NTSB research into crew casual factors in 
aircraft accidents (para. 2 above) found that 
the top two factors were (i) pilot deviated from 
SOPs and (ii) Inadequate cross check by 
second crew member. These causal factors 
appear to be the same for the SS2 accident. 
 
The Scaled Composites’ SS2 co-pilot came 
from the aviation domain, and he would have 
been aware of the need for effective Crew 
Resource Management (CRM). CRM is 
defined [5] as; 
 
‘a set of training procedures for use in 
environments where human error can have 
devastating effects. Used primarily for 
improving air safety, CRM focuses on 
interpersonal communication, leadership, and 
decision making in the cockpit’ 
 
As the definition implies, CRM is not related 
to the technical knowledge and flying skills of 
pilots but rather with the interpersonal skills 
and cognitive skills i.e. the ability to 
communicate, maintaining situational 
awareness and for solving problems and 
making effective decisions.  
 
Designs should not rely on pilots having the 
‘right stuff’ all of the time. Indeed, the Federal 
Aviation Administration Office of Commercial 
Space Transportation (FAA-AST) §460.15 [6] 
detail the following human factors 
requirements:     
An operator must take the precautions 
necessary to account for human factors that 
can affect a crew's ability to perform safety-
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critical roles, including in the following safety 
critical areas— 
(a) Design and layout of displays and 
controls; 
(b) Mission planning, which includes 
analysing tasks and allocating functions 
between humans and equipment; 
(c) Restraint or stowage of all individuals and 
objects in a vehicle; and 
(d) Vehicle operation, so that the vehicle will 
be operated in a manner that flight crew can 
withstand any physical stress factors, such as 
acceleration, vibration, and noise. 
 
Note item (d) above in relation to the NTSB 
findings detailed in bold further above in para. 
3. 
 
Additionally, in terms of being able to 
withstand any physical stress factors, FAA-
AST launch licensing requirements detail the 
crew requirements, including pilot experience 
and medical requirements [6]. 
 
However, the IAASS [7] and Aerospace 
Medical Association (AsMA) [8] recommend 
that suborbital spaceplane pilots have a first-
class medical certificate (not a second-class, as 
recommended by the FAA-AST) and be 
selected from military fast jet 
programs/astronauts i.e. pilots whom have 
experienced high g-forces and can cope with 
the environment; thereafter when mature 
suborbital operations are established, this 
could be relaxed to allow other (airline) pilots 
to be employed. 
 
4. SAFETY BY DESIGN 
Suborbital spaceplanes (or Reusable Launch 
Vehicles using the US terminology) are 
designed and operated using a mix of Aviation 
& Space attributes. So what design standards 
should be followed? A mixture of both or are 
forerunners designing on the edge of 
innovation and designing their way using their 
own practices, whilst being cognisant of 
eventual FAA-AST Launch Licensing 
requirements? This is stated as a question 
because the FAA-AST are NOT certifying 
these vehicles. 
 
Space safety standards dictate a Design for 
Minimum Risk (DMR) philosophy. This 
includes deriving Fault Tolerance, Safe-Life 
and Fail Safe criteria (also for aviation). The 
FAA-AST DMR philosophy within Advisory 
Circular AC 437.55-1 [9] details the following 
Safety Precedence Sequence: 
 Eliminate hazards (by design or operation) 
 Incorporate safety devices 
 Provide warning devices 
 Develop and implement procedures and 
training. 
 
Notice that in space the key term is ‘hazard’. 
Hazards are analysed and then, as part of 
quantitative analysis (see section 5) a 
cumulative assessment is made in order to 
determine whether the Target Level of Safety 
has been met i.e. top-down analysis. In 
aviation, although the term hazard is 
recognised, the focus is on lower level failure 
conditions associated with failure modes i.e. in 
order to meet safety objectives such as 1x10-9 
per flying hour for catastrophic events i.e. 
bottom-up analysis per AC1309 [10]. 
 
As part of the FAA-AST requirements for a 
launch license permit (CFR §437.55) the 
safety design analysis must consider the 
following: 
 
(1) Identify and describe hazards, including 
but not limited to each of those that result 
from— 
(i) Component, subsystem, or system failures 
or faults; 
(ii) Software errors; 
(iii) Environmental conditions; 
(iv) Human errors; 
(v) Design inadequacies; or 
(vi) Procedural deficiencies. 
 
The NTSB report [4] found that the designers 
(Scaled Composites) had not undertaken 
human error analysis (as the cause) in relation 
to decision errors and skill-based errors. The 
FAA-AST inspectors noted this and for PF04 
provided a waiver against §437.55 (for not 
completing human error or software fault as a 
causal factor). We all want the nascent 
industry to succeed and we want innovative 
designs (we don’t want to ‘stifle’ the industry) 
BUT we want safety driving success – not 
waivers for incomplete analysis. 
 
4.1. KEY SAFETY REQUIREMENTS 
By understanding space and aviation 
requirements the authorities and/or designers 
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could identify key safety requirements that 
should be achieved in the design. For instance, 
a space requirement is that any Inadvertent 
Failure Modes that could result in a 
catastrophic outcome should have 3 
INHIBITS. This means 3 separate and 
independent inhibits which could be hardware 
(physical switches/guards etc.), software 
(latches) or combination thereof. The IAASS 
Space Safety Manual [11] is based on the 
NASA and (European) ECSS standards and 
rationalised/consolidated into one manual; in 
relation to ‘Functions Resulting in 
Catastrophic Hazards’ the following 
requirement is stated: 
A system function whose inadvertent operation 
could result in a catastrophic hazard shall be 
controlled by a minimum of three independent 
inhibits, whenever the hazard potential exists. 
One of these inhibits shall preclude operation 
by a radio frequency (RF) command or the RF 
link shall be encrypted. In addition, the ground 
return for the function circuit must be 
interrupted by one of the independent inhibits.  
At least two of the three required inhibits shall 
be monitored. 
 
Unfortunately, the Commercial Space 
Transportation Advisory Committee 
(COMSTAC), whom advise the FAA-AST, 
gave the IAASS Suborbital Safety Guidance 
Manual the ‘Cold-Shoulder’ [12]; COMSTAC 
comprise US space players including XCOR 
and Virgin Galactic. 
 
Since the SS2 accident and following NTSB 
findings, Virgin Galactic have undertaken 
additional systems safety analysis and have 
implemented modifications to SS2 [13] 
including: 
 
1. DESIGN: Feather locking pin, controlled 
by the vehicle flight computer, which 
prohibits pilots from unlocking the tail 
section early 
a. Pilots will have a mechanical 
override if the locking pin fails 
2. PROCEDURAL: VG now deciding to 
keep the feather locked until after the 
rocket engine has shut down 
a. Pilots will have three- to five 
minutes to troubleshoot in case of 
problems before the feather would 
be needed for re-entry 
 
5. SAFETY TOOLS & TECHNIQUES 
There are a number of standard system safety 
analysis techniques such as Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), 
Failure Modes Effects & Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) to name a few [14]. 
The FAA-AST hazard analysis AC [9] also 
refers to the System Safety Process AC 
431.35-2A [1515], which includes an 
exemplar Safety Programme Plan (SPP); this 
AC dictates these standard techniques 
including the FMECA. This analysis would 
have identified an inadvertent failure mode, 
resulting in catastrophic outcome, and hence 
demanded further mitigation. The FAA-AST 
provide the following 3-pronged approach 
(Figure 3) and additional detailed 
methodology (Figure 4) within AC 431.35-
2A: 
 
Figure 3: FAA-AST 3-Pronged Safety 
Approach 
 
The 3-pronged approach includes: 
 Expected Casualty Analysis; this relates to 
analysing the risks to the public in the 
event of a vehicle break-up, explosion or 
malfunction turn for instance 
 Operating Requirements; this relates to 
deriving operating procedures and 
limitations to minimise risk to the public 
 System Safety Analysis; this provides 
detailed guidance for vehicle design 
organisations in order to derive safety 
requirements that need to be considered as 
part of the design (as detailed in the 
following figure) 
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Figure 4: FAA-AST System Safety Engineering 
Guide 
 
Note in the middle of the figure above, the 
requirement to undertake a FMECA. 
 
Another safety technique is the Operating and 
Support Hazard Analysis (OSHA) [16] - here 
the aim is to analyse the pilot (and maintainer) 
procedures and the safety engineers then 
review these to determine whether any hazards 
are affected by the procedure and also to 
identify where the human can skip steps or do 
the steps incorrectly. The FAA OSHA 
guidelines state that: 
 
This is performed by the Contractor primarily 
to identify and evaluate hazards associated 
with the interactions between humans and 
equipment/systems 
 
Back to the SS2 accident, it was clear that the 
co-pilot did the procedure step too early as 
indicated by the red circle below [17] (Figure 
5): 
 
 
Figure 5: SS2 PF04 Flight Crew Procedures 
 
Note the ‘verbal call’ at 0.8 Mach that the co-
pilot had to make whilst in this busy stressful 
phase, as well as the trim stabilizer call, 
followed by the actual unlocking of the 
feather. The NTSB report notes that the co-
pilot had memorised these tasks (from cockpit 
video footage) rather than read these critical 
steps from the procedures card (which was on 
his knee-pad) – which arguably could then 
have been ‘checked’ by the pilot. 
 
6. SYSTEM SAFETY & HUMAN 
FACTORS ENGINEERING 
DISCIPLINES 
This paper has focused on the system safety 
analysis that is performed (normally) in 
accordance with standard safety tools and 
techniques that would address human-machine 
interactions (both as causes and procedural 
controls). By undertaking diverse safety 
analysis, appropriate coverage is provided in 
order to identify all hazards and provide 
derived safety requirements (see figure 4) that 
will then be verified and validated during the 
development. 
 
Human Factors experts also provide valuable 
analysis as part of a programme. Here the 
focus is on human factors integration (or 
human factors and ergonomics [HFE]) and this 
includes analysing the cockpit displays for 
instance i.e. anthropometry, cognitive 
psychology, display layouts including colours 
for cautions and warnings etc. and analysing 
test procedures. 
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Figure 6: Human Factors that affect 
performance [18] 
 
In relation to the SS2 PF04 the NTSB Human 
Performance Presentation noted the following 
Stressors contributing to the accident: 
 Memorization of tasks ‐ Flight test data 
card not referenced 
 Time pressure ‐ Complete tasks within 26 
seconds ‐ Abort at 1.8 Mach if feather not 
unlocked 
 Operational environment ‐ No recent 
experience with SS2 vibration and load 
 
The Stressors noted above relate to ‘human 
capabilities’ in Figure 6 in that the co-pilot 
memorized his tasks which needed to be 
completed by Mach 1.8 and arguably his 
‘mental state’ may have been affected by the 
‘operational environmental’ in the rocket 
phase of flight (during the transonic bubble) 
with vibration and noise.  
 
The NTSB report [19] provides further details 
including details of the cockpit layout and 
instrumentation i.e. human-machine interface 
(or ergonomics) aspects. The NTSB found no 
major contributory factors. 
 
On projects, a problem can exist when the 
separate disciplines do not work together 
effectively i.e. design engineers, safety 
engineers, human factors engineers, software 
engineers etc. Previous IAASS conferences 
have had presentations from NASA in their 
goal for continuous improvement stating that 
design and safety engineers are now working 
more closely; and then in a separate 
presentation stating that designers and HF 
engineers are working better; well how about 
all disciplines working together?  And how 
about using safety and human factors 
specialists with appropriate qualifications, 
experience and training (from the beginning)? 
 
7. FOCUSING ON THE RIGHT (SAFE) 
THING 
The SS2 accident has highlighted that although 
initial suborbital pilots should originate from 
flight test schools and still possess similar 
traits to their earlier (1950s) test pilot brethren, 
they should be protected by the right (safe) 
thing by design and analysis rather than rely 
on the right stuff due to ineffective design and 
operating procedures. This paragraph details 
some aspects of the right (safe) thing: 
 
Organisational factors. The co-pilot of SS2 
PF04 did not mean to make a critical mistake 
and arguably contributory factors lay at the 
organisation level. This relates to the pilot 
procedures (which should be a safety net to 
prevent errors) and training; here the 
procedures were practiced in the simulator, 
however the simulator cannot realistically 
replicate the transonic phase with the vibration 
and noise etc. Professor Nancy Leveson’s 
Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and 
Processes (STAMP) [20] takes a holistic 
organisational approach and, instead of 
defining safety management in terms of 
preventing component failure events, it is 
defined as a continuous control task to impose 
the constraints (control actions) necessary to 
limit systems behaviour to safe changes and 
adaptations. So here we can learn that 
particular focus should be spent on analysing 
the procedures (controls) more effectively to 
prevent errors – if this means adding design 
steps to prevent errors, all the better. The 
simple answer is to always have a check-
response (feedback loop, per STAMP) for 
procedural steps during critical stages of the 
flight (or indeed design the system such that 
minimal pilot actions/verbal calls are 
required).  
 
Human Factors. The suborbital flight profile 
involves rocket-powered flight at Mach 3, with 
g-forces, vibration, noise and mix of 
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atmospheric and space loads. This is extreme 
interaction of man, the machine and the media 
(environment) is depicted well within the 
military-based Operational Risk Management 
as detailed in the FAA System Safety 
Handbook [21]: 
 
Figure 7: Human Factors 5-M model 
 
The management can have a major influence 
on whether a suborbital flight results in a 
successful mission or a mishap (accident). It is 
the management (organisation) who make the 
decisions to fly at the Flight Readiness 
Reviews and who decide on the skillset of the 
pilots, the safety engineers and the human 
factors engineers. 
A HF specialist should be employed to analyse 
the HFE aspects, particularly for suborbital 
flight. This can be based on existing military 
and civil knowledge base but adapted for the 
unique suborbital profile. 
 
Safety by Design. It is of no use to have a 
‘safety officer’ employed at some point in the 
programme to do some ‘hazard analysis’ to 
satisfy the FAA-AST requirements. System 
Safety Engineers should be employed from the 
concept phase so that they can follow best 
practice by undertaking detailed and diverse 
safety analysis. By doing this, derived safety 
requirements will then be able to influence the 
design i.e. these will then require design 
decisions as to acceptance or rejection (with 
rationale). Such requirements would include 
levels of fault tolerance, fail-safe and safe life 
design, and design and development assurance 
levels. Section 4 further above details the 
(space) safety precedence sequence using the 
Design for Minimum Risk approach. The 
Aerospace Recommended Practices detail the 
‘typical’ development lifecycle from Concept 
phase to Design Validation & Verification 
(including testing); this then also is carried 
through to operations. It is imperative to have 
a SQEP safety engineer from the start who 
understands the diverse safety techniques and 
tools. 
 
Figure 8: SAE ARP 4761 System Safety 
Process – detailing typical lifecycle (hence 
requirement to have safety engineer from the 
beginning, undertaking diverse and formal 
safety analysis) 
 
Safety Tools and Techniques (used by 
SQEP). It is of no use to just have a Fault Tree 
and hazard log as your safety artefacts. 
Aviation and space best practice detail diverse 
safety techniques (and tools) in order to 
identify hazards (as well as functional failure 
modes). Indeed, the FAA-AST have 
reasonable guidance, as detailed in section 5 
above. The FAA-AST specifically state that 
human error analysis (as a cause) should be 
carried out. 
You only know about diverse safety 
techniques if you have learned about them, 
have been trained to use them and have used 
them in appropriate context. Also that your 
work has been independently checked by 
experts and/or authorities i.e. you have been 
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involved in programmes using 
airworthiness/spaceworthiness standards 
(meaning that you know about standards and 
regulations). 
So it is vitally important that suborbital 
operators/designers employ SQEP safety 
engineers. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper reviewed the SS2 accident in order 
to highlight some of the issues associated with 
suborbital flights. These flights involve a 
rocket-power, phase, g-forces and extreme 
environments and so pilots must be provided 
with the design and the tools (procedures) to 
cope with the exacting profile. The pilots must 
also be suitably fit (medically) and be 
provided with the ‘realistic’ training. Why? – 
so that they do not have to rely on the ‘right 
stuff’ i.e. flying on the seat of their pants and 
dealing with problems on their own. By 
undertaking effective systems safety analysis 
(per best practice/guidance) then the vehicle 
will be designed with consideration for safety 
(from derived safety requirements). The safety 
(and human factors) analysis will have 
included human error as a cause (as well as 
considering the human as a control i.e. pilot 
recovery to a malfunction). The safety analysis 
would also have covered inadvertent 
operation/function of a system (by fault or 
human incorrect selection) and, with a 
catastrophic outcome, would have derived that 
3 Inhibits are required. 
 
So suborbital operators/designers should 
ensure that the pilots are protected by the right 
(safe) thing by design and analysis rather than 
rely on the right stuff. 
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